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SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TO MOBILE TERMINALS 
A FORECAST OF NEEDS AND TECHNIQUES
By: Q. C. Wilson 
Acton Laboratories, Inc. 
Massachusetts
ABSTRACT
Economic pressures and technical devel­ 
opments lead to an international satellite com­ 
munications and surveillance system satisfying 
the needs of many mobile users, especially 
aircraft. The dominant need is to provide 
three-dimensional surveillance of air space 
around airports. The large number of carrier 
and general aircraft requires the satellite 
system and its ground control facility to carry 
the burden of providing adequate link margins 
and position computation.
INTRODUCTION
Economic pressures and recent technical 
advances will lead to an international satellite 
communications system satisfying the needs of 
many mobile users, especially aircraft. It is 
timely to encourage designing complete and 
competitive systems in order to provide guid­ 
ance to the ITU World Administrative Radio 
Conference for Space Communications which 
will convene by early 1971 to make treaty 
regulations for frequency allocations.
Competitive designs will also provide 
guidance to the Department of Transportation 
for satisfying air traffic control needs and 
navigation needs of many users. The previous 
DOT administration has already requested the 
aid of industry to this end. Vigorous design 
efforts are needed now to prevent a drifting 
policy detrimental to efficient and safe use of 
national air space. System design is a vehicle 
for conducting intelligent dialog within the 
technical community and is a prerequisite to 
sound budgetary estimates. A complete state­ 
ment of system performance (including an im­ 
plementation plan) can be matched against the 
most critical needs as well as against existing 
systems that may eventually be retired and 
proposed systems of limited utility.
Designing a system to meet these needs 
will be an exceedingly complex political, 
economic, and technical problem with many
intersystem and interorganizational relation­ 
ships. Several substantial studies have shown a 
specific utility of satellite communications for 
navigation and mapping, administrative traffic 
to air carriers, Atlantic air traffic control, and 
world-wide weather data systems. The plan for 
satisfying all these needs is a jig-saw puzzle not 
yet assembled. However, air terminal congestion 
takes precedence as the greatest need. Air 
traffic controllers have demonstrated in a 
dramatic and responsible way that they are 
overloaded. The FAA has attempted to find suit­ 
able relief in automation and display without 
making progress against the tremendous in­ 
crease in traffic. Proliferation of airports and 
systems of the present kind will push the FAA 
budget alone above one billion dollars and push 
a larger burden onto local communities. A 
better system seems to be promised by further 
automation.
Contemporary radar defies simple automa­ 
tion. An air traffic control computer should 
track every target. But radar was designed to 
track single targets with the aid of an operator 
who can discriminate a real target from clutter, 
atmospheric reflections, multipath, etc. The 
basic limitation of radar is that the returned 
signal decreases by the 4th power of the dis - 
tance. Transponders on aircraft cause jam­ 
ming because of the poor geometry of ground- 
based radar. Satellite-based radar can over­ 
come these faults.
Fortunately, the technical base for a sys­ 
tem which provides a surveillance function for 
many users has resulted from military and 
space efforts. Inexorable economic pressures 
of air transportation will forge an effective 
union of organizations to use these techniques. 
By attempting to forecast .the economic pressure 
and the most likely technical solutions, the 
author hopes to stimulate extensive dialog.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
(TECHNOLOGY SEARCHING FOR A NEED)
Many studies have explored the feasibility 
of using satellites to satisfy specific needs. 
Some studies propose system designs. Their 
general shortcoming is parochialism. Satellite 
communications shows promise at considerable
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expense. By attempting to satisfy limited needs, 
the studies leave doubt that the effort is worth­ 
while. Thus, the characteristic flavor of the 
recent past has been technology searching for a 
need.
However, needs are not lacking. In fact, 
the air traffic control problem is so big that it 
appears to impede organization by intimidation. 
At last year's annual meeting of the AIAA 
several authorities suggested diverse political 
organizations that should or can do the system 
design. New political unions are being explored 
in order to bring the effort to a workable ad­ 
ministrative level. All of these activities are 
indicative of the pressures to form union that 
will implement a useful system.
Synoptic Weather Data System Requires 
Little Capacity
Many studies have considered imple­ 
menting a weather data system using satellites. 
Comparisons with aircraft interrogation 
systems show an economic advantage to satel­ 
lite systems. HF radio interrogation suffers 
from diurnal variability and irregular perfor­ 
mance. Buoys designed for long life in the 
ocean have been under development and testing 
for over five years. Missing elements appear 
to be a data relay network, a position-fixing 
capability, and reliable mooring.
The benefits of long range weather pre­ 
diction are really not known in fiscal terms. 
The efforts of DOT to present a substantial 
case before Congressional committee have 
met questioning indicating that need priority is 
assessed relatively low. Actually, data capacity 
requirements are so low as to encourage 
waiting to see what may develop in other satel­ 
lite communications experiments or system 
proposals.
Marine Navigation Users Show Interest
The Navy Navigation Satellite System 
called "Transit" (NNSS) has proven itself 
useful for ships and research vehicles as well 
as for Navy requirements. Commercial receiv­ 
ers are now available for about $50, 000. This 
passive system depends on the doppler shift of 
a signal from a low altitude polar satellite. 
Ephemeris data is broadcasted to users. The 
use of only four satellites at low altitude limits 
position updating to every 108 minutes. The use 
of low UHF frequencies ultimately limits accu­ 
racy to tenths of a mile. The measurement 
time is the time for the satellite to pass over 
the user.
ATS VHF satellites have communicated 
with a merchant ship 1 ,. A NASA (ERG) study is
compiling the needs of the marine .community 
for satellite navigation* These experiments and 
studies show the feasibility of satellite commu­ 
nications for marine use,
NASA Has Best Systems Capability but Appears 
to be Withdrawing
NASA has conducted experiments and 
studies of wide scope directed towards satellite 
air traffic control. The Joint Navigation Satel­ 
lite Committee provided comprehensive intra- 
governmental guidance towards system design . 
However, their limited budget has been directed 
primarily to the race to the moon. Futhermore, 
Mr. Harper, NASA deputy associate adminis­ 
trator for aeronautics has said that system 
design should be done by FAA, while NASA should 
concentrate on hardware.Recent research fund­ 
ing cuts on air traffic control research and 
ATS F and G satellites show that Congress is 
not sympathetic to allowing NASA to take a 
more active role in air space problems. Even 
rather modest efforts to experiment with the 
1540-1660 mHz band have been stopped. Industry 
has noted that weak fiscal position and is seek­ 
ing opportunities elsewhere.
An example of the type of system design 
that NASA has sponsored is given in the TRW 
NAVSTAR report . It recommends a passive 
navigation system coupled with position report­ 
ing by the aircraft back to the controller. The 
aircraft provides position computation. Mari­ 
time users are not excluded.
History shows that NASA is endowed with 
the management capability to attempt to do new 
and difficult things in full view of the nation. 
This contrasts with the philosophy of an operat­ 
ing organization such as FAA which has such 
immediate difficult operational problems that 
changes must be evolutionary. The solution to 
the air traffic problem is going to require inno­ 
vation. Although several organizations could do 
the job, only NASA has recently demonstrated 
this type of gut effort.
RTCA, ARINC,and COMSAT Proposed a System 
of Limited Capability
The combination of the RTCA community, 
ARINC, and COMSAT provides considerable 
interest because it puts quantitative numbers 
on certain needs. These three groups hoped to 
solve the problem of air traffic control over the 
oceans as well as to provide administrative 
communications to aircraft. If FAA had joined 
the union and accepted a limited capability of 
ocean air traffic control (positions reported 
back from the aircraft over the satellite circuit) 
funding may have been under way by now. How­ 
ever, the domestic airlines did not feel that the 
capability of VHF satellite communications was 
that great an improvement over present capa­ 
bility to warrant picking up a 10 million dollar 
yearly bill. Thus the aviation community re­ 
presented by RTCA has given some indication 
of the value of satellite communications to its 
operations and the FAA has indicated the value 
of ocean air traffic control in light of its budget 
and political position on direct surveillance.
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COMSAT Over-Capitalization Seeks Relief 
from Charter Limitations on Opportunities
The union is also interesting because it 
illustrates complex organizational problems. 
COMSAT by its Congressional charter cannot 
sell services to individual users; it must be a 
carrier's carrier. An exception (obtained later) 
is that it can sell directly to NASA or DOD. This 
and other expansions of service areunder fire 
from INTELSAT. Thus COMSAT has national 
and international constraints to look to in join­ 
ing a union. ARINC provides a carrier interface 
between COMSAT and the individual users. The 
interface between COMSAT and FAA is presum­ 
ably more difficult in that it may require Con­ 
gressional action when the concept expanded to 
provide control over the national air space. In 
the 88th Congressional Senate Committee on 
Aeronautical Space Services, Mr. Jaffe of 
NASA objected to COMSAT activity towards 
providing navigation and air traffic control to 
ships and aircraft. COMSAT has surplus capital 
and an aggressive management, to help over­ 
come these inter organizational difficulties .
The implementation of a VHF communi­ 
cations capability providing four voice channels 
on three satellites was admittedly not very 
ambitious but would establish early precedence 
for a workable union. A j^reliminary study for 
COMSAT by Philco-Ford anticipated that the 
eventual system could be in the 1540-1600 mHz 
band (so that it could provide position-fixing 
capability to 0. 2 mile using two satellites). 
Oceanic needs were assumed so VHF provided 
sufficient accuracy. Actually, a VHF imple­ 
mentation would probably have affected the 
WARC meeting which will be held in 1971 to 
study allocations for space communications. 
COMSAT has filed with the FCC a request that 
the WARC allow the 1540-1660 mHz band to 
include maritime mobile service.
ICAO Takes a Long View
ICAO is the international equivalent to 
RTCA. Last year it convened the ASTRA panel 
to study satellite communications technology. 
During the RTCA Fall Assembly in 1968, 
comments were made by RTCA and ICAO mem­ 
bers on the relative positions of the two bodies . 
RTCA favored VHF without question, while ICAO 
felt that it was too early to make a recommenda­ 
tion. (In fact, France has already recommended 
an L-Band system). ICAO says that the problem 
is international and requires careful comprehen­ 
sive study so as to not commit the world to an 
inadequate solution. The slow acceptance of 
VORTAC by smaller nations can be put in jeop­ 
ardy by mention of a new system.
The RTCA discussions indicated the many 
subtle considerations that are required to obtain 
general international acceptance of a system for 
the world air fleets.
DOD is Not Directly Involved
U.S. military development has often 
influenced navigation of the civilian and com­ 
mercial air transportation industry. DME went 
through extensive dialog before proving its 
suitability for general aviation. Now news 
releases indicate that DOD is investigating satel­ 
lite communications under programs called 
TACSATCOM and ICNI. These public announce­ 
ments do not suggest that the proposed concepts 
or systems will be useful to civil aviation. 
In fact, Dr. Finn Larson made clear at the 
RTCA Fall Assembly that the DOD does not 
consider this area to be within its jurisdiction. 
It is probably safe to say that the tremendous 
resources of the military will not be applied 
directly to solving air traffic control problems.
FAA and DOT Have Little Congressional Support
The FAA continues to fight its fiscal and 
operational battles with courage and honesty if 
not inspiration. Perhaps operational responsi­ 
bilities of operations vital to public safety are 
burden enough for one organization. Neverthe­ 
less, FAA documentation and reports directed 
to the FAA continue to give good account of the 
situation. Direction seems to be lacking because 
of conflicts in opinion within the FAA and between 
FAA and NASA and industry. The question is 
surveillance vs position reporting.
Several years ago, the growing load on air 
traffic controllers led NASA and industry to say 
that mpre responsibility should be given to the 
pilots . Air collisions dramatized the need. 
The momentum carried several companies to 
cooperate with the FAA in a Collision Avoidance 
System which would use a major portion of the 
1540 to 1600 mHz band. These are now nearing 
test. Meanwhile, in-route traffic control has 
been sufficient to stop collisions between air 
carriers. So far the results of the CAS activity 
are systems which will cost each aircraft over 
$50, 000 for a need which does not seem to be as 
urgent as terminal control. Furthermore, the 
system competes for a major part of the most 
desirable frequency for position-fixing.
Actually, surveillance which depends on 
aircraft-derived position information is incon­ 
sistent with positive control of the National Air 
Space and is not accepted by the FAA. CAS 
seems to be an independent safety system which 
cannot in the long run relieve terminal congesticn. 
A surveillance system which depends on aircraft 
reporting their positions obtains its strongest 
proponents among those responsible for super­ 
sonic trans-oceanic safety. Some supersonic 
aircraft will use triple-redundance inertial- 
guidance units costing about $300, 000. Cannot 
this capability be coupled with a satellite 
communications reporting circuit to provide 
the necessary air traffic control ? Those in the 
FAA who disagree feel that terminal control
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remains the significant problem, especially for 
the many aircraft without accurate navigation 
aids.
The FAA is commendable in its reporting 
of experiments . Both the FAA and its many 
critics give a clear indication of the limitations 
of radar as the prime sensor of the controller. 
Critics emphasize the poor reliability of radar 
while the FAA reports a struggle with the dis­ 
play interface as well as with automation of the 
tracking function. The FAA has found to its 
chagrin that transponders introduce interference. 
Angels and bad weather also confuse the display. 
Thus automation of the tracking function is not 
going to be complete or comfortably reliable.
Meanwhile, the air traffic controller 
continues to be overworked and even irritated 
by attempts to help ease his burden since any 
system test imposes further strains on an 
already tense operation situation.
The FAA clearly points out that automa­ 
tion is the least expensive way to relieve ter­ 
minal congestion . Proliferation of airports 
can provide the greatest potential improvement 
but at tremendous expense to the community 
served . The impact of this observation is 
weakened by the credibility of the promise of 
automation. Considering the limitations of the 
present billion dollar radar system, automation 
is only a partial aid.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY LACKING
The DOT, through the FAA, obtensibly 
has responsibility for our future air space,Fiscal 
control is in the hands of the President and 
Congress. The FAA has been criticized for not 
vigorously fighting for funds to do its job. No 
comprehensive and detailed long-range plan is 
visible in the documents of the FAA or in its 
record before the BOB or Congress. Since the 
necessary programs are costly, funding really 
cannot be expected without showing the Admi­ 
nistration and Congress that an improvement is 
needed and is possible at reasonable cost. A 
spokesman with a detailed plan is wanting.
Q
Dr. Seiffert of MIT , Dr. Cherrington of 
Harvard, and others who despair of the lack of 
directed activity suggest that a super agency of 
private form will become the chosen instrument 
chartered by Congress to handle air traffic 
control. COMSAT itself has proposed to build a 
limited system. COMSAT is over-capitalized 
and also limited by charter to few investment 
opportunities. Personnel within the FAA are 
sympathetic to COMSAT. Members of the 
aviation community will give support. Therefore, 
the possibility of another COMSAT activity is a 
distinct possibility if the Congress does not 
choose to solve the problem.
Congress will Limit U. S. Government Partic­ 
ipation
However, control of the air space is a 
function which cannot be passed on to private 
organizations without rending the fabric of the 
governmental authority since regulation is 
implied. There are proponents for either NASA, 
intra-governmental unions, or not-for-profits 
to do the system design for FAA. So far the most 
interesting system design proposals have come 
through NASA efforts. Congress, however, has 
cut NASA funds towards this end. The R & D 
funds of the FAA have steadily dropped. Thus, it 
appears that Congress repudiates the responsi­ 
ble government agencies.
The international aspect of the system will 
lead to the development of regulatory laws 
through treaty agreements of ITU and ICAO 
members, and to system development through an 
international consortium. International coopera­ 
tion would broaden the fiscal base while permit­ 
ting the least expensive satellite configuration . 
Congress will enjoy release from the responsi­ 
bility of difficult management decisions while 
retaining a maximum of funds for defense 
spending. COMSAT capitalization will start 
development.
NEEDS
PRIMARILY AIR TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE
Automation is the least expensive way to 
minimize termial congestion . High speed 
ground transportation will be limited to very 
dense centers such as between New York and 
Boston and Washington. Since the U.S. is 
committed to air transporation for long distance 
travel, congestion is a fundamental limitation 
on our capability to do business. Therefore, the 
bottleneck will be attacked directly. Fortunately, 
the FAA has been giving careful attention to the 
causes and possible remedies to terminal delay. 
No compromise with safety is apparent in their
deliberations. Organizations such as RTCA
10 and MIT also give insight into our domestic
air traffic problem.
What then prevents automation ? The many 
studies of the FAA lead to the conclusion that 
the judgment of air traffic controllers is neces­ 
sary to overcome the inherent deficiencies of 
the radar system which is the primary sensor 
of the controller. No significant improvement 
can come from improving the control center or 
the display system. Radar transponders do not 
increase reliability as expected because they 
jam the display system. It is necessary to look 
at this limitation in more detail.
Air Traffic Control Limited by Radar
Radar does not give the terminal control­ 
ler sufficiently reliable position-fixing data. The 
terminal area may include over 100 targets. 
Radar depends on repeated reflections to
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display these targets. The display often shows 
clutter and angels from clouds, birds, and 
multipath reflections. Omnidirectional aircraft 
antenna patterns have deep nulls. Often MTI 
circuits and aircraft maneuvers cause the 
target to disappear. The controller must com­ 
pensate these deficiencies by mentally tracking 
the aircraft during holding or landing. The 
strain during poor conditions is great. Futher- 
more, the shortage of controllers leads to extra 
duty. Automation of the radar tracking function 
is expected to help.
The ARTS program for providing.this 
tracking function, while also tagging the dis­ 
play with identification and altitude information, 
is now being installed in several locations. The 
addition of the third dimension, altitude, comes 
from the aircraft altimeter. The acquisition of 
track still depends on operator selection. The 
transponders have introduced a jamming pro­ 
blem since the transponded signal is strong 
enough to hide a passive target. It can even be 
reflected into the backlobes of the radar antenna. 
Automation has not relieved the operator of 
concern for the correctness of his display.
There are many minor airports which do 
not have a radar facility at all. Several acci­ 
dents have occurred to aircraft off-course 
while landing. The possibility of altitude error 
has been often indicated. A need for extending 
two dimensional radar coverage to these areas 
has lead to FAA and industrial development of 
low cost systems. Three dimensional radar is 
needed.
The number of voice transmission between 
aircraft and ground overload the available 
channels and require frequent channel switching. 
RTCA has proposed a digital message entry 
device for automating and speeding up the com­ 
munications process by at least cutting down 
identification time
The mechanism for assuring safety is 
spatial separation. Separation distances are 
based on radar accuracies and aircraft closing 
speeds. If anomalous conditions such as bad 
weather interfere with operations, increased 
separation is scheduled. Unfortunately, the peak 
traffic loads at several airports are overloading 
the traffic control system even in good weather. 
Bad conditions cause the controllers to stack 
aircraft in holding patterns. Thus the slowdown 
increases the load on the controller and an 
excessive delay builds up. The present solution 
is a FAA limitation on the number of flights 
during peak periods. Adequate safety is trans­ 
lated into a limitation on the revenue of carriers.
Other Solutions will also be Needed
Several alternate solutions are being 
studied. Ground transportation such as high 
speed trains in the Northeast are being encour­ 
aged by DOT. Alternates to travel such as
telephone communications have led to facsimile 
and picturephone experiments. New airports are 
being planned. No doubt all will be needed;never- 
theless, our nation's commitment to air for long 
distance transportation will require in addition a 
workable air traffic control system.
New Airports are not the Whole Answer
New airports cause problems. Land 
acquisition is often very difficult because of the 
political strength of the large number of affected 
people. Furthermore, if the new airport is close 
to the old, interference between air traffic 
compounds the controller's job or limits the in­ 
creased capability. Finally, the cost of one 
large airport is about the same as a world-wide 
satellite facility. The FAA has indicated that 
new airports are going to be the most costly 
solution. The major burden of that solution will • 
fall on the local community. Therefore airport 
development leaders should be very interested 
in air traffic control development.
Geometry is Important for Good Radar 
Performance
Why does radar perform so badly ? Two 
geometric factors (the signal strength decreas­ 
ing with the 4th power of range, and the multi- 
path and atmospheric effects on a signal which 
propagates nearly parallel with the earth) cause 
the most trouble. A radar on a satellite avoids 
these problems for elevation angles greater than 
20 degrees. Of course, this type of radar 
requires several satellites to be visible simul­ 
taneously to transponder-equipped aircraft. 
Angle sensing can no longer be done by steering 
a dish. In fact, this radar looks more like a 
navigation system working in reverse. The 
advantages are : a three-dimensional radar 
which has nearly constant range (signal strength) 
to all aircraft, several orders of magnitude more 
surveillance area, reduced clutter and inter­ 
ference from multipath from a transponded sig­ 
nal, and no signal returns from weather targets 
such as clouds.
Costs of Related or Comparitive Systems
Some quantitative indication of the need can 
be found by looking at the present air traffic 
control plant, the aviation industry, proposed 
system costs and other large programs. Table I 
lists these cost estimates. The table indicates 
that proposed systems are appropriate for the 
expected benefits and are similar to present 
air traffic control expenditures. In fact, the sizs 
of the industry will be a potent pressure towards 
a usable system.
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Table I -- Costs in Billions of Dollars
Satellite System with Control 0. 6 
Facility 12 . (5 years)
Automated Air Traffic Control (ARTS) 1.0
National Air Space Program 0. 3
FAA Radar System " 0.6
FAA Yearly Operational Budget 0. 6
New Airport for Boston 0. 5
New Carrier Aircraft Sales per Year 2. 5
Sentinel System Authorized 
Expenditures 1.8
Subsidiary Needs
Several important subsidiary needs are 
marine navigation, buoy weather systems, 
oceanic air traffic control, and collision avoid­ 
ance aids. These are fortunately not as de­ 
manding on satellite capacity as a system for 
control of air space. In fact, oceanic control is 
assured by a domestic system. These needs 
require a small fraction of the prime power 
requirements of the satellite system because of 
their low data requirement.
Long range marine navigation is aided by 
Loran, Omega, and Transit systems. All of 
these aids have especially useful characteristics 
to different users. On what basis is a competi­ 
tive system needed ? The need could be based 
upon the long range retirment of Loran stations 
(but probably not Omega stations which use very 
low frequencies in order to obtain long range 
even to submerged vehicles). The Transit satel­ 
lite system uses a relatively inexpensive polar 
satellite system and puts the burden of naviga­ 
tion computation on the user. The basic reason 
for considering a new system is to get wider 
use from these systems by making the receiver 
simple and doing the computation at a central 
facility.
A toll-type communication system, 
available to users for emergencies and business 
as well as for requesting a position-fix, satis - 
fies the need. Present navigation aids are simi­ 
lar to position-fixing by sextant in that it takes 
time to obtain the measurements and reduce 
them to a position. Sometimes bad conditions 
interfere with Loran and Omega and occasionally 
Transit. The availability of Transit for up­ 
dating is limited by the few number of satellites 
in low polar orbit. What is needed is a system 
in which a user requests, a position-fix by satel­ 
lite communications and the request auto­
matically is reduced to a position-fix after 
passing simultaneously through several satel­ 
lites to a ground-based computer facility. The 
return answer contains the position-fix.
The above need is similar or even iden­ 
tical to what is needed for an oceanic buoy 
system. A position-fixing capability helps solve 
one of the most difficult mooring problems of a 
buoy field. Buoys need constant attention because 
they loose their moorings in a few months. Even 
untethered buoys become possible if they can be 
tracked.
The cost benefits of a satellite system for 
oceanic air traffic control is based on the nar­ 
row flight path variations for economical super­ 
sonic flight. The forecasts show that congestion 
is likely by 1979. These aircrafts are scheduled 
to have three inertial navigation platforms. 
Using this reliable system to obtain the air­ 
craft position for transmission to the control 
facility over a dependable communications 
system is the heart of several proposed systems. 
However, the cost of this navigation surveil­ 
lance package eliminates the less sophisticated 
user since the navigation system alone costs 
about $300, 000. Implementation would provide 
good communications to many users but would 
not satisfy the basic needs of air traffic control 
in the USA. On the other hand, the implementa­ 
tion of an air traffic control system for general 
use would satisfy both needs for a community of 
users at least two orders of magnitude larger.
WATERSHED IDEAS
Initial assumptions have controlled the 
style of proposed systems. This section states 
several ideas which seem pivotal if all needs 
are to be met. Since needs exert pressure on 
the system design, this section is a forecast of 
how satellites will be used to provide air traffic 
control and other functions for the civilian popu­ 
lation.
Surveillance and Communications Service 
Not Passive Navigation
While past proposals have been based on 
passive navigation, the future system will use 
active radar surveillance with transponding 
targets. The transponders also will provide 
communications. All computations and message- 
routing will be done by a satellite control facility. 
These services will be offered to private users 
through organizations such as ARINC, to mili­ 
tary users through DCA, and directrly to gov - 
ernmental departments. The service organiza­ 
tion will be capable of dealing with national and 
international relationships. The service orga­ 
nization will be (or be similar to ) COMSAT. 
There will be no direct military participation 
requiring passive navigation.
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Between 10, 000 and 100, 000 Users SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY
The large number of users radically 
drives the system design to minimum-cost 
user terminals. This single consideration will 
select the type of modulation , the frequency for 
transmission, and the radiated power of the 
satellite system. It will cause the position com­ 
putations to be done by the service organization. 
The large number of users eliminates the possi­ 
bility of free access : toll service will be avail­ 
able to subscribers on demand. Each message 
unit will be quickly handled to avoid system 
saturation; therefore, the type of operation will 
not resemble the processes of Omega, Loran, 
and Transit which require human judgment or 
manipulation. The reliability of the service will 
be like that of the telephone.
Many Satellites at all Latitudes
System reliability will come from having 
many satellites. Position-fixing depends on 
having several satellites available to every user 
at angles greater than 20 degrees elevation but 
distributed around the user's horizon. This 
minimum elevation angle minimizes the effect 
of atmospheric and ionospheric conditions which 
lay parallel to the surface of the earth and plagie 
present radar and communication signals. 
Furthermore, the user's omnidirectional an­ 
tenna can be designed to have relatively lobe- 
free performance over this fraction of a hemi­ 
sphere. The large number of users makes the 
satellite system cost a small fraction of the 
total system cost. In fact, the estimated satel­ 
lite system costs are comparable to costs of our 
present-unsatisfactory system. In any case, the 
satellite costs will not be provided directly by 
U. S. funding.
The Air Traffic Surveillance will be Automatic
An automatic surveillance system depends 
on air tubes with fixed schedules, like a railway, 
to assure safe separation. The satellite system 
will interrogate aircraft transponders as needed 
to assure separation and will advise air traffic 
control and the effected aircraft of deviations. 
This service would permit positive control of 
the air space for carriers and others equipped 
with sufficient on-board navigation to fly area 
navigation routes. General aviation, at lower 
altitudes (as well as marine users), would use 
the system as navigation aid available on request. 
The air traffic controller in the terminal area 
would be relieved of the task of using a radar 
scope as the prime sensor for watching carrier 
and business plane s. Furthermore much of the 
controller's present communications traffic 
will be accomplished automatically by the radar 
interrogation system.
Today's technology supports the type of 
system which will satisfy the needs listed above. 
Several companies are already entering the 
breadboard testing phase on company-sponsored 
activities anticipating satellite communications 
and navigation systems. The type of system that 
is satisfactory for the larger community and for 
quick position-fixing will use frequencies around 
one gHz. Furthermore, the user terminal will 
use a rudimentary fractional-hemispherical an­ 
tenna which does not introduce a significant drag 
penalty to supersonic planes. Consequently, the 
dominant problem is how to obtain the required 
satellite radiated power to satisfy the link 
equations. Phased array antennas on satellites 
having about 1000 watts prime power are within 
the weight capability of several of our opera­ 
tional launch vehicles. The present activities 
are to determine the best type of array for this 
type of system. The question is really a system 
synthesis trade-off which also includes the 
selection of modulation and orbit configuration. 
Finally, input/output technology will be utilized 
by user terminals to assure that the system does 
not saturate.
TDM for the Satellite Phase Array
The phased array competes directly with 
solar arrays in providing high radiated powers. 
The phased array can also be used by the satel­ 
lite in its receiving mode so as to minimize 
user transmitter power. If the organization of 
the phased array depends on linear power 
amplifiers in order to generate simultaneous 
beams , a 3 dB amplifier penalty effectively 
doubles the satellite weight over a system which 
steers a single beam. Time Division Multi­ 
plexing (TDM) permits steering a single beam 
to many users. Experiments have been conducted 
by COMSAT demonstrating TDM modulation . 
The implied wide bandwidth signals do not need 
to use high accuracy oscillators in the user 
equipments. These arguments suggest that the 
final system will use burst signals much like 
the response of a IFF transponder to radar 
interrogation.
High-Altitude Inclined-Circular Orbits with 
Phase-Phase Array
A few satellites in synchronous orbit do 
not satisfy navigational accuracy or coverage 
requirements. Such satellites could use a high 
gain frequency-scanned array. Instead the satel­ 
lites must have earth tracks which reach at least 
middle latitudes. However, the moving satellite 
cannot easily use a frequency scanned antenna 
because the user would have to change fre­ 
quencies according to the position of the satel­ 
lite. Investigations of inclined synchronous satel­ 
lite orbits are available . These orbits and 
polar orbits have earth tracks which cross. 
Two satellites in close proximity only provide 
the position-fixing triangulation of one satellite.
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Other orbits will overcome this doubling and 
also reduce the crowding expected at synchro­ 
nous altitudes which shall be reserved by the 
IT for fixed ground stations. As an example, 
a subsynchronous orbit causes the figure-eight 
earth track to open up into a sinusoidal track 
having no cross-overs. Four or five cycles 
around the earth at 45 degrees inclination re­ 
quires less ETR launch vehicle capability than 
a stationary satellite .Station keeping is only 
necessary relative to the other satellites and 
does not depend on geospheric irregularities. 
Futhermore, position-fixing implies simul­ 
taneous paths to several satellites. Therefore, 
a phase-phase antenna array is indicated.
Digital Input/Output Devices
Simple automatic digital input/output 
devices will be used to eliminate system 
saturation. A request for a position-fix 
should only require a push of a button. The 
answer should go only to the requester as a 
printout, alpha-numeric display, or the pre­ 
recorded voice from an enunciator. Trans­ 
mission of a message should occur after the 
message has been composed. These digital 
devices eliminate the time required for human 
communications which now burdens the aircrew 
and the airtraffic controller. Fortunately, 
several types of equipments are now being 
investigated by the airlines, RTCA , the 
police, and computer terminal vendors.
SUMMARY
Automation of air traffic control will 
require a satellite system to provide position- 
fixing and communications. Navigation, com­ 
munications, and telemetry needs of ships,, air­ 
craft, and buoy networks will also be satisfied. 
The system will result from a bold application 
of space technology; it will not be an evolu­ 
tionary development. The design will minimize 
subscriber equipment costs. Nevertheless, the 
system costs will be less than the present 
system for air traffic control and will 
provide for forecasted air transportation 
growth.
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